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91
Metaphysics / Re: 2012 Metaphysics exam
« Last post by Casey Enos on May 19, 2012, 11:56:18 am »
Good luck with Aristotle...
I'm curious as to how long your answers typically come out to be; I found myself filling up the entire answer books plus supplementary pages and  sometimes I wondered if I let myself get sidetracked. Do you draw up outlines or anything, or just go right into writing?
Do you know, by chance, when the results are typically published?
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Metaphysics / 2012 Metaphysics exam
« Last post by waveletter on May 19, 2012, 11:07:08 am »
Hello everyone:

Yesterday morning I sat for the Metaphysics exam. Not particularly confident about my preparation on this topic, I left early, brought my printed-out notes on 5 topics (personal identity, counterfactual causation, universals, substance, and vague objects), and right away got stuck in some nasty traffic. Great: Looks like I should have studied for the determinism question as well. Anyway, I worked my way past a multi-vehicle fender-bender and got to the community college parking lot about 45 minutes early, time enough to flip through my notes and make some final personal excuses to myself.

But, it turned out that the exam was quite straightforward. I worked on questions 2, 4, and 9: counterfactuals, personal identity, and vague objects. As usual, my handwriting started out moderately ugly in the beginning and quickly degraded into almost illegible scratches on the exam sheets. I was able to grind out answers, though, and felt pretty good, but drained, by 1 P.M.

I'm playing Aristotelian scholar right now. The exam for The Philosopher is next Thursday, the 24th, near the end of the line for this year. When I get some time, I'll publish some of my notes for these exams on the forum. If you need some relief, you might check out some of S. Peter Davis's 3 Minute Philosophy (rated R, for mature audiences only, by the way) tube videos:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwOCmJevigw

Good luck to you all on the exams you have left! --Ron

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General Discussion / Re: New Regulations
« Last post by Casey Enos on May 13, 2012, 06:14:06 pm »
I'm excited about the chance to do a dissertation, but I am a little bummed as well that they cut some of the classes they did, "Philosophy of Science" was one I was really looking forward to....
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General Discussion / Re: New Regulations
« Last post by waveletter on May 13, 2012, 10:11:11 am »
Hi Casey & all:

It looks like there is some relief from the 3 hour exams on the Level 4 and 5 courses, but the advanced courses are still 3 hour ordeals. So, that's probably easier to deal with. I think it allows a student to pick up several courses (say 3 or 4) in one year without having to get just blasted by exams in May.

I like the Dissertation. You can really specialize on this one, but I wonder if you'd be allowed to pick a topic freely or whether the topic you pick is confined to the areas covered by the regular Level 4,5,6 courses.

I haven't done the Historical Ethics yet, so it looks like I'd have to go through the Introduction to Philosophy course. That might not be bad, maybe fun. Still, I'm reading that if you transfer, you still just get 1-to-1 credit for Old Regs courses. It adds two more courses to what you have to do, in other words. Also, there's still a loss of some of the richness of the Old Programme, no Phil of Maths, no Post-Aristotelian, no Frege-Russell-Wittgenstein, etc. But maybe you could do this in the Dissertation.

Eh, my feelings are mixed to negative about it, just from where I'm at in the Old Programme. For someone new to the BA, or just starting period, it looks like a nice, but vanilla, BA Programme. What do you think? Thanks for pointing this out to us, Casey! --Ron
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General Discussion / New Regulations
« Last post by Casey Enos on May 12, 2012, 11:17:18 am »
So, what does everybody think about the new regulations? Anyone else planning to transfer to the new program?
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Well, I just put this essay down about line for line on the exam....maybe not a good choice in retrospect, since I couldn't remember well enough to quote even one line of the original literature in support. Hopefully my answer on Zeno will balance it out!
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Just trying to get the ball rolling on this topic...
Analyze and Assess JUST ONE of Plato’s proofs of the immortality of the soul.
The immortality of the soul a constant preoccupation of Plato’s Socrates, especially, naturally enough, in the dialogues dealing with the events immediately surrounding his death. The arguments can be roughly grouped into three major categories based on the main premise of the argument: that of the various actions of casual agents on the soul; arguments from recollection; and technical arguments based on the nature of the Platonic Forms and their interactions within the body and soul. This paper will focus on an argument of the first type, the “Argument from Opposites” which is presented in the middle part of the Phaedo. Under close examination, the argument holds an apparently valid form, but is based on premises which are dubious, and in some cases at odds with other Platonic theories.
The most important premise of the argument focuses on the generation of what would today be termed relative predicates, but which in Plato’s era would have been viewed as casual agents more akin to substances. Socrates, possibly inspired by Anaximander or Heraclitus, noting that heat takes the place of cold and the moist of the dry, presents the general formula that in the case of opposites X and Y, X varies in inverse correlation with the presence of Y.
Socrates then moves from this formula to the observation that X and Y will always succeed one another, and indeed one cannot exist without the other. It makes no sense to speak of heat without cold, or moist without dry. He then applies his formula to the case of life and death, noting that they also form a relationship which can be subsumed under the same formula and concludes that life must come from death, and vice versa, in a similar pattern of the alternation of opposites that holds elsewhere in nature.
The argument thus far consists simply of the premises:
1.   Opposites are generated from opposites
2.   Life is the opposite of death
       ˫ 3.   Life is generated from death
Socrates continues his argument by pointing out that if what died remained dead, then the stock of live things would be depleted over time and eventually the entire universe would become lifeless. Since obviously living things exist, death cannot be a permanent state. Therefore the following premises are added to the argument:
4. If the dead remained dead, everything would become dead
5. Everything is not dead
˫6. Death is not a permanent state
What has been presented so far could well be an argument for reincarnation, rather than for the immortality of the soul. However, another argument in the Phaedo presented at length in the Meno, provides the necessary additional premise to establish the survival of the soul between the succession of life and death.
             *7. Learning is really a recollection of knowledge learned by the disembodied soul prior to birth
Several problems with the premises emerge under examination. Premise 2, while sound as stated in isolation, is dubious as a support for the argument from opposites because the nature of the relationship is dramatically different from the ones which Socrates uses as examples. The relationship of heat and cold, and of moist and dry are both matters of degree. It is possible, for instance, for any object or system, including the universe as a whole, to vary in temperature by degree as heat and absence of heat (cold, an agent equivalent to heat in Greek thought rather than an indicator of absence), alternate by degree. It makes no sense to speak of an individual human soul-the object for whom Plato is trying to prove immortality-as being a certain degree of dead and a certain degree of alive. Clearly what is being dealt with here is a pair of opposites which are completely different in nature from the ones admitting of the formula which Socrates attempts to apply to them.
The mechanisms which generate the alternations of other opposites can be empirically established. The application of heat causes heat to replace cold, its dissipation brings the return of cold; liquid substances and their evaporation cause the alternation of moist and dry. While the emergence of new life is apparently a concept the Greeks understood imperfectly, how it can be said to constitute a replacement of death by life rather than an emergence of living from non-living, is never actually explained.
Another problem is contained in Premise 4. Assuming that the rest of the argument is in fact accurate, it could still be postulated that the universe contained a stock of life which simply had not yet run out, in the way that the modern conception of a universe subject to entropy postulates an initial stock of heat. In order to counter this possibility, it must be postulated that the universe is eternal, thus allowing sufficient time for the life in the universe to be completely depleted regardless of how extensive it is. However, Plato several times elsewhere in his work makes a case for a universe with a finite age, including the creator god in the Timereaus and the argument for immortality which postulates a living agent as the initiator of movement in the universe in the Phaedrus.

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Epistemology / Re: Sample Answer: "How Can you Know You Are Not Dreaming"
« Last post by waveletter on May 09, 2012, 06:26:30 pm »
Hi Casey:

The exam results aren't posted until about the end of August, so it'll be a while before we find out anything. If you felt good about your answers, then you probably did quite well. If you're just writing something to fill the pages, and it's not really to the point, then you know that, and that's not a good sign. OTOH, I know some students have written into the VLE that they thought they did a lot better than their marks turned out.

Your brother might be right about references. In my practice essays, I try to supply them, just to help me remember and also to help me find the place that has the relevant text. Sometimes I put (+/-) in there, to show I'm not absolutely sure about it. Hmm....

My exams are Metaphysics on the 18th and Aristotle on the 24th. I'm withdrawing from circulation to cram for the exams, one day per chosen topic/question. It seems like the more advanced the exam, the later it comes in the month. Which makes me very happy. Anyway, congratulations on writing a solid paper. Best of luck on the others! Sounds like you are off to a good start. --Ron
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Epistemology / Re: Sample Answer: "How Can you Know You Are Not Dreaming"
« Last post by Casey Enos on May 09, 2012, 01:07:30 pm »
Well, I just got back from sitting epistemology, so I guess time will tell how I did, although it felt pretty solid.
You did sort of address one thing I was wondering about-what sort of citation is needed in these exams. Since we are writing from memory, are we required to fully cite sources, including the year of publication, as you do in your practice essays? That seems like a lot to remember! My brother teaches pol. science at Harvard and assured me he would only expect his students to name an author, but warned me that expectations might be different in other disciplines...
I think you are right about the skeptic's argument not being symmetric, we may not be able to tell when we are dreaming that we are doing so, but when awake we can determine that we are not. The skeptical argument is so far fetched that we can put it on the shelf of logical possibilities next to the brain in a vat scenario...
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Epistemology / Re: Do you know that you know the Earth moves?
« Last post by waveletter on May 09, 2012, 12:43:33 am »
Hi Tim:

No one has chimed in, so I guess I'll offer a few thoughts on this problem.

There seem to be two issues in your post: (i) whether if one knows P, then one knows that one knows that P (in the title of the post) and (ii) whether we know P when we have come to believe P through testimony.

I'm not sure if point (i) was a typo, but it seems to me to be, generally, incorrect. It would lead to an infinite regress of lengthening known beliefs. I would know that I know that I know that ... you get the idea. On the other hand, you might want to say that there is a general principle that if I know P, then, in principle, I know that I know that P, for any P. I'm not sure if this is part of your earlier question about whether we can know without believing or not. In any case, in my view, knowing something doesn't require any reflection upon that knowing situation. You just do know without even believing that you know that you know. There is knowing without there necessarily being a meta-knowing.

On the second point, if you take knowledge to be justified, true belief, then I could say that I do know the Earth moves. It's true, I believe it because my kindergarten teacher told me so, and I'm justified because it is a belief that has been passed down to me by a long chain of trustworthy witnesses and scientists, beginning with Copernicus. Or maybe Aristarchus. A skeptic would probably attack the justification through testimony.

On the other hand, suppose I tried to defend a causal theory of knowledge (CTK, Goldman), so that I don't have to have a justification, just a causal tie to the actual fact. Then I'd have to argue that the cause of my belief that the earth was moving was the moving earth, whereas, really, it was my school teacher that implanted the thought in my brain. But, the defense of the CTK here, of course, is that the causal chain can be long and indirect...as long as it can be traced out, in principle, the causal account works. So that's one tie-in, between your example of socially propagated knowledge and the causal theory.

There's probably also a good case to make for a coherence theory here. That the moving earth coheres with a whole lot of other stuff that we actually directly perceive, such as the rising sun, the tides, and the jet stream, and I don't know what else, but what my teachers and my books stuffed into recalcitrant me.

This is a pretty interesting question, and since the bulk of our knowledge (or what we think is knowledge) really comes to us by way of testimony, it's a crucial question. I think the key is to identify the issues and tie the question to some of the existing theories of knowledge, like the CTK, if you wanted to defend testimony as a basis for saying one knows something.

A defense of knowing things like this is G.E. Moore's paper In Defense of Common Sense. But Moore is often accused of question-begging.

Wish I could be of more help. What is your angle on this problem? Thanks! --Ron
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