I am struggling to understand in what way the Gettier counter-examples pose an effective threat to the tripartite analysis. For those who're familiar with Dancy's tennis example: last year's tennis match has absolutely no bearing on this year's outcome and so it is only a matter of chance that my belief turned out to be correct. It's the same as believing that there is milk in the refrigerator based on seeing a milk carton which actually contained orange juice. My belief would not be justified, and I would not know that there is milk in the refrigerator, even if it turns out that there really is milk in the refrigerator (in another carton, which I did not notice the first time I opened the refrigerator).

What do you think?

I tried to look at this forum last night to see if there had been any activity and found only the message "Old forum archived. Contact Support forum if you want to access it..." So I posted an enquiry on the Support forum and they have promptly unarchived us    Judging by the number of similar requests, I guess the system administrators regularly archive forums that have not been accessed for a few weeks. This one hadn't had any new postings since August. Maybe the university VLE forums are starting to take over instead?

Hello UoListas:

I saw on the official UoL website that registration for BA/Diploma in Philosophy was open. I wasn't able to figure out if I could do that online, however. I also got an email that I hadn't opened that a DHL International package was dispatched to me, but it didn't say who the sender was. It might be that London has kicked off the registration for 2012-13.

I haven't received a personalized letter yet with a recommendation on which programme to pursue (New or Old?). Just a generic one. Anybody else out there get anything of interest?

Thanks & hope you all have a fruitful year! --Ron

Deductive Logic is another subject that comes up on every exam. This is a rehearsal draft for an answer I used on last years exams.
"Any justification of deductive reasoning will itself rely on deductive reasoning".
A deductive argument is one formulated so that, if validly constructed and the premises are true, the conclusion must likewise be true. Logical laws, such as Modus Ponens and the functioning of syllogisms, are used to bring the argument forward to its conclusions. The question immediately arises: what garuntees the truth of the conclusion? If it is the logical laws, the rules of deduction, what is that garuntees their validity? It seems to most that the rules of deduction must be justified, if they can be justified at all, by themselves, thus generating a circular system.
One entertaining challenge to the system of deductive logic was presented by Carroll in the story of the Tortoise and Achilles. The former, presented with a straight forward case of Modus Ponens (if P then Q, therefore Q) simply refuses to grant the conclusion. Every time Achilles attempt to introduce a new premise to the argument showing that if one accepts P one must also accept Q, the stubborn tortoise simply continues to call the process into question. As Achilles adds more and more premises, an infinite regress beckons and finally he is forced to admit the impossibility of proving the validity of the process he is using other than in its own terms. Finding an adequate response to the tortoise's disbelief is the task of modern logicians who wish to provide some element of justification to the use of deduction.
Reactions to Carroll's story have varied considerably. Some have concluded that deductive reasoning is by nature circular, like other human activities it can operate only with the introduction of rules, and function only within those rules, thus for better or worse a circles is inescapable. Searle, in his lectures, countered what he considered to be the key mistake, that of treating the deductive basis of the argument as if it was simply another premise; in fact it is the fundamental basis for thought and as such cannot be intelligibly challenged.  Russell addressed the specific challenge to Modus Ponens by drawing a distinction between "implies" in the traditional logical sense; and between P and Q, either or both of which or both of which may or not obtain; and "entails", which links together a P and Q asserted by the argument. Clearly the two are very different propositions, with the later allowing the unchallenged move from P to Q, but with the introduction of A Prosteri elements, which, as we will see, are disallowed by most accounts of deduction.
Another, more serious challenge, was posed by Hume. Hume began by challenging the concept of deductive reasoning, attacking it on the notion that any sort of reasoning which has worked so far will only hold valid on the untestable hypothesis that the future will resemble the past, an objection presented more formally by Goodman. Therefore, any attempt to support deduction through the use of inductive reasoning will inevitably  fall short of the absolute certainty required for deduction. For Hume, the uncertain validity of inductive seasoning leaves deduction without any sort of support, a position which he viewed as untenable. At best, deductive reasoning, which is true only by the relationship of the ideas it contains, is separated from any sort of contact with the outside world
Modern attempts to provide justification for deduction in the face of such challenges have focused on the notion of "logical consequences", that is on the provisions of logic which allow sentence to be deduced one another, thus allowing the movement from premise to conclusion. These "deductive theoretic" systems are based on the principle that 'X is a logical consequence of K if and only if X can be deduced from K in a deductive system'. Such a system, relying entirely on deduction, must be carefully separated from a "modal-theoretic" system in which X is a consequence of K in all available models, a type of system which operates under different, not forcibly deductive premises, in attempting to establish that X is a necessary truth given K.
Tarski, attempting to define "logical consequences" in terms of its normal usages, gives three rules for the deduction of one sentence from another:
1. The logical relation depends entirely on the formal aspects of the systems involved
2. The relation is a A Proiri , that is, independent of any outside evidence.
3. The deduction is necessary, given the system of rules in which one is operating.
While this is one of the most developed of criteria for deductions, possible questions criticisms are immediately evident. Most importantly for the question we are considering is the requirement that justification be conducted in an A Priorimanner and based entirely on formal elements, these together ruling out any attempt to base a system of deduction on anything other than its own rules and axioms. Ayer agreed, noting that deductive statements are true only by the definitions of the operators involved, however even this view is a problematic  one since the definition of logical operators is itself a subject of continuous controversy.
Based on these criteria for deduction, we are still left with an entirely circular system, one that we can only be extracted from by assertions like Searles  that deductive logic forms an unchallengeable foundation for thought. However, it is very difficult so see on what grounds deduction could then be justified, other than by observation of how it holds across cases, so that by definition it would no longer deductive, or by accepting it as not in need of justification. The later is also a highly questionable option, especially given recent challenges posed by modern physics to basic logical laws used in deduction.
Deduction has been defined by the metaphor of someone in a dark room who has complete knowledge of their language, but none of the outside world; whatever conclusions they can piece together must be deductively valid. Even a system with such a limited scope may be open to challenge. Quine stressed that no portion of human knowledge can be held to be immune from revision, even the logical laws in which deduction are based on are open to revision, notably since quantum mechanics has recently    provided a strong challenge to the law of the excluded middle and other previously basic rules. Therefore, it seems that as human knowledge expand, even what was at one point considered true by definition is open to revision, and deductive logic is left without any tenable basis. Because logical truths are by definition to hold across an infinite number of possible cases, yet they are based on definitions which are subject to change and revision, they cannot be said to have any justification at all.

Hi Fadi:

I would recommend that you follow historical sequence wherever possible. So, take the Modern Philosophy course next, if you have to choose between it and Epistemology. (Actually, these two go together quite well!)

The reasons for this, as I see it, are:

1. There are a number of "modern philosophy" questions in the Intro texts, and on its exams, and your are following-up on them in taking Mod Phil.

2. It's true that there are also some epistemological questions in the Intro course, but you probably should have some grounding in what earlier major thinkers in the Western tradition have said before you try to answer them. In other words, you should have already taken Mod Phil.

That being said, I could see that if you were averse to Descartes, for example, or just hated reading Locke, and preferred the modern debates, say with Moore on the external world or with Gettier examples, then jumping forward to consider 20th century epistemological debates might be the right path. But, again, I think that this is not the right choice. Go with the historical order.

Sorry to have been so slow to reply; I've been distracted by personal and work issues of late.

Anyone else with thoughts on this? Thanks & best of luck with the rest of the programme! --Ron